In the setting of multi-agent games, considerable effort has been devoted to the definition of modal logics for strategic reasoning. In this area, a recent contribution is given by the introduction of Strategy Logic (SL, for short) by Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi. This logic allows to reason explicitly about strategies as first order objects and express in a very natural and elegant way several solution concepts like Nash, resilient, and secure equilibria, dominant strategies, etc. The price that one has to pay for the high expressiveness of SL semantics is that agents strategies it admits may be not behavioral, i.e., a choice of an agent, at a given moment of a play, may depend on the choices another agent can make in another counterfactual play. As the latter moves are unpredictable, this kind of strategies cannot be synthesized in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, game theory has exhibited to be a fruitful metaphor in open-system verification, where the evolution emerges from the coordination of different parts viewed as autonomous and proactive agents [1] , [2] . This has encouraged the development of several modal logics aimed at reasoning about strategies and their interaction [3] - [7] .
An important contribution in this field has been the development of Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL * , for short), introduced by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman [3] . Formally, it is obtained as a generalization of branching-time logic CTL * [8] , where the path quantifiers there exists "E" and for all "A" are replaced with strategic modalities of the form " A " and "[[A]]", for a set A of agents. These modalities are used to express cooperation and competition among agents in order to achieve a temporal goal. Several decision problems have been investigated about ATL * . In particular, the modelchecking problem is proved to be 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE [3] .
Despite its powerful expressiveness, ATL * suffers from two strong limitations: 1) strategies are treated implicitly through modalities that refer to games between competing coalitions and 2) strategic modalities only represent coupled ∃∀ and ∀∃ quantifications over strategies. These limitations make ATL * less suited to formalize several important strategic notions, such as Nash Equilibrium and the like.
The above considerations led to introduce and study in [9] a more powerful logic for strategic reasoning in order to "unpack" and extend the ATL * modalities. The result is Strategy Logic (SL, for short), which extends ATL * in two fundamental aspects. First, strategies are first-order objects that can be existentially and universally quantified. Specifically, SL uses the existential x and the universal [[x]] strategic modalities, which can be read as "there exists a strategy x" and "for all strategies x", respectively. Second, strategies represent general conditional plans that at each step prescribe an action on the base of the previous history. Thus, strategies are not intrinsically glued to a specific agent, but an explicit binding operator (a, x) allows to bind an agent a to the strategy associated with a variable x.
The SL features allow a finer-grained description of extensive games and reveals aspects that other classic subsumed logics, such as ATL * , are not able to grasp. In particular, a key aspect in the theory of extensive games is that strategies are behavioral, that is, by repeating Myerson's words: "the correlation between the move he [i.e., an agent] chooses at one information state and the move would have chosen at any other information state has no significance" [10] .
However, the expressive power of SL allows to specify some sentences that can be satisfied only by agent strategies that are not behavioral. More specifically, in a determined history of the play, what Myerson calls "information state", the value of an existential quantified strategy may depend on how the other strategies will behave in the future or in other counterfactual plays. This means that, to choose an existential strategy, we need to know the entire structure of universal strategies on all possible histories, which is in general unpredictable, as what we actually know is their behavior on the history of interest only. This means that non-behavioral strategies cannot be synthesized in practice.
Additionally, by maintaining in SL this kind of strategies, we lose important model-theoretic properties and incur in an increased complexity of related decision problems. In particular, in [11] , it has been shown that the model-checking problem becomes non-elementary complete. To gain back elementariness, several fragments of SL, strictly subsuming ATL * , have been investigated and studied in [11] , [12] . Among the others, One-Goal Strategy Logic (SL[1G], for short) encompasses formulas in a special prenex normal form having a single temporal goal at a time. For a goal, it is specifically meant an SL formula of the type ψ, where is a binding prefix of the form (α 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (α n , x n ) containing all the involved agents and ψ is a linear-time formula. In SL[1G], each temporal formula ψ is prefixed by a quantificationbinding prefix ℘ that quantifies over a tuple of strategies and binds them to all agents. In [11] , [12] , it has been showed that SL[1G] admits behavioral strategies 1 only and this has been a key aspect in showing that the model-checking problem for this logic is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, as it is for ATL * . This adds motivations on the importance to restrict our attention to behavioral strategies in SL.
In this paper, we achieve the target of identifying sufficient criteria for what is behavioral in SL. Specifically, we consider two syntactical fragments of SL, strictly subsuming SL[1G], namely the conjunctive-goal and disjunctive-goal, respectively called SL[CG] and SL[DG], for short. These logics are obtained by forcing SL formulas to be only of the form of conjunctions or disjunctions of goals. As main result, we show that also SL[CG] and SL[DG] admit behavioral strategies only. Moreover, since SL formulas with any Boolean combination of goals, named SL[BG] in [11] , [12] , turn out to be non behavioral, we have that SL[CG] and SL[DG] represent the maximal syntactic fragments of SL that are behavioral. We also solve the model-checking problem for SL[CG] and SL[DG] via alternating tree automata. As for SL[1G], the fact that these fragments are behavioral is a key aspect to strongly simplify the reasoning about strategies by reducing it to a step-by-step reasoning about which action to perform. More precisely, we avoid the projection operation for each quantification in the formula (as it is instead required for SL) by using a dedicated automaton that makes an action quantification for each node of the tree model. As a formula may require different goals to take care of simultaneously, a specific duty of the automaton is to show that such goals can be treated separately, but maintaining their mutual coherence. As this automaton is only exponential in the size of the formula (in particular, it is independent from the alternation number of quantifications in the formula) and its non-emptiness can be computed in exponential time, we get that the model-checking for both SL[CG] and SL[DG] is solvable in 2EXPTIME. It is interesting to observe that the same result holds for SL[1G], while for SL [BG] it still open the question whether the model checking problem is elementary or not.
Besides the theoretical aspects, SL[CG] and SL[DG] enable to formalize several interesting game properties that cannot be expressed in SL[1G], and hence in ATL * . Specifically, on one hand, in SL[CG] it is possible to formalize scenarios where an agent can join two or more different coalitions without producing mutual conflicts or, somewhat conversely, 1 In [11] , [12] , we improperly call this kind of strategies elementary. it can assure that none of them prevails over the others. As it will be clear in the following, in such a case, conjunctive goals are strictly required. As shown in [13] , this feature is essential also to address interesting issues such as coalition decomposability, that is whether a whole coalition can be split in smaller, and hence more manageable, sub-coalitions. On the other hand, in SL[DG] it is possible to formalize implication between goals, which can be used to express that a winning condition is weaker that another one.
Due to space limit, most of the proofs are omitted and reported in an extended version. We refer to [9] , [11] , [12] for more motivations, examples and related material. For other recent works in the field of strategic reasoning, one can also see [14] - [22] .
Outline: The rest of the work is structured as follows. In Section II, we first introduce syntax and semantics of SL and introduce its fragments SL[CG] and SL[DG], along with some inspiring examples. Then, we give the notion of dependence map, which is used to define the concept of behavioral semantics. In Section III, we show that classical and behavioral semantics for both SL[CG] and SL[DG] coincides. In Section IV, we describe the modelchecking procedure for the introduced fragments and show a 2EXPTIME upper bound. Finally, we conclude the work with some observations and discussions.
II. STRATEGY LOGIC
In this section, we first describe concurrent game structures and give some preliminary notions. Then, we recall syntax and semantics of Strategy Logic (SL, for short) and introduce the new fragments SL[CG] and SL [DG] . Finally, we define the notions of dependence maps and behavioral semantics. For a detailed introduction on SL, see [11] .
A. Concurrent game structures
As in ATL * , SL is interpreted over concurrent game structures [3] , which are labeled transition system,where each state represents a configuration of an extensive game characterized by a set of atomic propositions denoting its meaning. Transitions between states represent possible concurrent moves of the players involved in the game.
Definition II.1 (Concurrent Game Structures). A concurrent game structure (CGS, for short) is a tuple G AP, Ag, Ac, St, λ, τ, s 0 , where AP and Ag are finite non-empty sets of atomic propositions and agents, Ac and St are enumerable non-empty sets of actions and states, s 0 ∈ St is a designated initial state, and λ : St → 2 AP is a labeling function that maps each state to the set of atomic propositions true in that state. Let Dc Ac Ag be the set of decisions, i.e., functions from Ag to Ac representing the choices of an action for each agent. 2 Then, τ : St × Dc → St is a transition function mapping a pair of a state and a decision to a state.
In the following, we use the name of a CGS as a subscript to extract the components from its tuple-structure. Accordingly, if G = AP, Ag, Ac, St, λ, τ, s 0 , we have that Ac G = Ac, λ G = λ, s 0G = s 0 , and so on. Before introducing our logic, we need some preliminary definitions.
A track (resp., path) is a finite (resp., an infinite) sequence of states ρ ∈ St * (resp., π ∈ St ω ) such that, for all 0
The set Trk ⊆ St + (resp., Pth ⊆ St ω ) contains all non-zero length tracks (resp., paths). Moreover, Trk(s) (resp., Pth(s)) indicates the subsets of tracks (resp., paths) starting at a state s ∈ St. Intuitively, tracks and paths of a CGS G are legal sequences of reachable states in G that can be respectively seen as partial and complete history of the game.
A strategy is a partial function f : Trk Ac that maps each non-zero length track in its domain to an action. Intuitively, a strategy is a conditional plan that for each partial history of G prescribes an action to be executed. For a state s ∈ St, a strategy f is said s-total if it is defined on all tracks starting in s, i.e., dom(f) = Trk(s). The set Str Trk Ac (resp., Str(s) Trk(s) → Ac) contains all (resp., s-total) strategies.
Let f ∈ Str be a strategy and ρ a track in its domain. Then, (f) ρ ∈ Str denotes the translation of a strategy f along ρ, i.e. a strategy such that 3 Intuitively, the translation (f) ρ is the update of the strategy f, once the history of the game becomes ρ. It is worth noting that, if f is a (ρ) 0 -total strategy then (f) ρ is lst(ρ)-total.
Let Var be a fixed set of variables. An assignment is a partial function χ : Var ∪ Ag Str mapping variables and agents in its domain to a strategy. An assignment χ is complete if it is defined on all agents, i.e., Ag ⊆ dom(χ). For a state s ∈ St, it is said that χ is s-total if all strategies χ(l) are s-total, for l ∈ dom(χ). The set Asg Var ∪ Ag Str (resp., Asg(s)
Var ∪ Ag Str(s)) contains all (resp., s-total) assignments. Moreover, Asg(X) X → Str (resp., Asg(X, s) X → Str(s)) indicates the subset of X-defined (resp., s-total) assignments, i.e., (resp., s-total) assignments defined on X ⊆ Var ∪ Ag.
As in the case of strategies, we also define a translation along a given track for assignments. For a given state s ∈ St, let χ ∈ Asg(s) be an s-total assignment and ρ ∈ Trk(s) a track. Then, (χ) ρ ∈ Asg(lst(ρ)) denotes the translation of χ along ρ, i.e., the lst(ρ)-total assignment, with dom((χ) ρ ) dom(χ), such that (χ) ρ (l) (χ(l)) ρ , for all l ∈ dom(χ).
As in first order logic, in order to quantify over strategies or bind a strategy to an agent, we update an assignment χ by associating an agent or a variable l with a new strategy f.
Let χ ∈ Asg be an assignment, f ∈ Str a strategy and l ∈ Var ∪Ag either an agent or a variable. Then, χ[l → f] ∈ Asg denotes the new assignment defined on dom(χ[l → f]) dom(χ) ∪ {l} that returns f on l and the same value that χ would return on the rest of its domain. It is worth noting that if χ and f are s-total then χ[l → f] is also s-total.
A play is the unique outcome of the game determined by all agent strategies participating to it; formally, given a state s ∈ St and a complete s-total assignment χ ∈ Asg(s), the function play(χ, s) returns the path π ∈ Pth(s) such that, for all i ∈ N, it holds that
Finally, for a state s ∈ St and a complete s-total assignment χ ∈ Asg(s), we define the i-th global translation that calculates, at a certain step i ∈ N of the play, what is the current state and its updated assignment. Formally, the i-th global translation of (χ, s) is the pair of a complete assignment and a state (χ,
As in the case of components of a CGS, in order to avoid any ambiguity, we sometimes use the name of the CGS as a subscript of the sets and functions introduced above.
B. Syntax and semantics
Strategy Logic (SL, for short) [9] syntactically extends LTL with two strategy quantifiers, the existential x and the universal [[x]], and an agent binding (a, x), where a is an agent and x a variable. Intuitively, these new elements can be respectively read as "there exists a strategy x", "for all strategies x", and "bind agent a to the strategy associated with the variable x".
Definition II.2 (SL Syntax). Given the set of atomic propositions AP, variables Var, and agents Ag, the formal syntax of SL is defined as follows:
where p ∈ AP, x ∈ Var, and a ∈ Ag.
By sub(ϕ) we denote the set of subformulas of the formula ϕ. For instance, the subformulas of
Usually, predicative logics need the concepts of free and bound placeholders in order to formally define their semantics. For example, in first order logic the only type of placeholders are variables. In SL, since strategies can be associated to both agents and variables, we use the set of free agents/variables free(ϕ) as the subset of Ag∪Var containing (i) all agents a for which there is no binding (a, x) before the occurrence of a temporal operator and (ii) all variables x for which there is a binding (a, x) but no quantification x or [[x]]. A formula ϕ without free agents (resp., variables), i.e., with free(ϕ) ∩ Ag = ∅ (resp., free(ϕ) ∩ Var = ∅), is named agent-closed (resp., variable-closed). If ϕ is both agent-and variable-closed, it is named sentence. By snt(ϕ) we denote the set of all sentences that are subformulas of ϕ.
The SL semantics is defined as follows.
Definition II.3 (SL Semantics). Given a CGS G, for all SL formulas ϕ, states s ∈ St, and s-total assignments χ ∈ Asg(s) with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ), the modeling relation G, χ, s |= ϕ is inductively defined as follows.
2) Boolean operators are interpreted as usual.
3) For a variable x ∈ Var and a formula ϕ, it holds that:
Finally, if the assignment χ is also complete, for all formulas ϕ, ϕ 1 , and ϕ 2 , it holds that:
It is evident that, due to Items 1, 2, and 3, the LTL semantics is simply embedded into the SL one. Furthermore, since the satisfaction of a sentence ϕ does not depend on assignments, we omit them and write G, s |= ϕ, when s is a generic state in St, and G |= ϕ when s = s 0 .
In what follows a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables is a finite word
we denote the set of variables occurring existentially (resp. universally) quantified in ℘. A binding prefix over V is a word of type (a 1 , x 1 ) . . . (a m , x m ) such that x i ∈ V, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and Ag = {a 1 ,. . . ,a m }. By Qnt(V) and Bnd(V) we indicate the set of quantification and binding prefixes over V.
We are now ready to introduce the two fragments of SL we are interested in this paper, i.e., the conjunctive-goal and disjunctive-goal strategy logic (SL[CG] and SL[DG], for short). In the following, when we have to refer to one of the two logics indifferently, we use the single acronym SL[XG]. 
where ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)) and ∈ Bnd(V), for a given set of variables V ⊆ Var.
The name of these fragments comes from the fact that formulas of the kind ϕ are called goals. It is also evident that SL[XG] resides between the logics SL[1G] (see [12] , for more), where ψ consists of a unique goal ϕ, and SL[BG] (see [11] , for more), which allows any Boolean combination of goals.
A first important result about SL [XG] , is that, differently from SL[1G], it is not invariant under decision-unwinding. Intuitively, by decision-unwinding [12] we mean the tree obtained by unraveling a given CGS w.r.t. all possible agent decisions. Consequently, SL[XG] is strictly more expressive than SL[1G].
Theorem II.1 (Unwinding Variance). There exists an SL[XG] sentence ϕ and two models G 1 and G 2 with isomorphic decision-unwindings such that G 1 |= ϕ and G 2 |= ϕ.
C. Inspiring examples
We now give a few specification examples, in order to show the expressive power of the introduced fragments.
As first example, assume that one wants to check whether an agent-provider can serve with a unique policy the requests of two agent-clients and the behavior of one agent-client cannot influence the request of the other one. This property can be described by the SL
where a 1 is the provider, a 2 and a 3 are the two clients, and F p and F q are the relative requests. Note that the ATL * formula φ 1 = {a 1 , a 2 } F p ∧ {a 1 , a 3 } F q is too weak for this aim, since according to it the strategies that a 1 may need to adopt in the two coalitions could be mutually inconsistent. Similarly, φ 2 = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } (F p∧F q) does not assure that the agentclients are independent, in the sense that no one of them can jeopardize the request of the other agent. In particular, we have that φ implies φ 1 ∧ φ 2 , but the converse is not necessarily true. More generally, sentences like φ can be used in several contexts. In the field of multi-agent systems, they tell us that the agent a 1 has a strategy that enables to form two independent coalitions with a 2 and a 3 , respectively, without embarking on a unique coalition formation process with both of them. In the context of formal verification, instead, such sentences can be used at different levels of analysis to test the fault-tolerance of a component w.r.t. the others or the robustness of an entire system, represented by a 1 , to possible misuses of single users (a 2 and a 3 ). Now, consider the CGS G of Figure 1 , where each transition is associated with a triple of binary values representing the decision of a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 , respectively (selfloops have been omitted for simplicity). Let x and y 2 set to be the strategy that constantly executes the action 1 and y 3 set to be the strategy that constantly executes 0. It is easy to see that, from the initial state s 1 , if x is bound to a 1 and y 2 is bound to a 2 , then the system is forced to reach the states s 3 or s 4 (where p is true). Similarly, if x is bound to a 1 and y 3 is bound to a 3 , the system is forced to reach the states s 4 or s 5 (where q is true). Thus, the previous sentence φ is satisfied in s 0 .
As another example, let us consider a game with three agents a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 such that a 2 and a 3 want to achieve G F p and G F q, respectively. We want to verify whether a 1 can act as a "super partes" agent that balances the evolution of the game so that the other agents can possibly satisfy their own goal. This can be Consider the CGS G of Figure 2 . If a 1 constantly executes the action 1, then the even steps of each possible play will be the initial state s 1 . From that state, a 2 cannot force the next state to yield ¬q and, vice versa, a 3 cannot force the next state to yield ¬p. Thus, G satisfies φ in s 1 . It is worth noting that a 1 does not have the power to decide which winning condition will be satisfied, however by executing the strategy 0 ω it denies both of them.
As final issue, consider the problem to check whether, given a two-player CGS G, a winning condition ψ 1 is more restrictive for a 1 that another condition ψ 2 . An ATL * formula such as [[{a 1 }]]ψ 1 ⇒ [[{a 1 }]]ψ 2 could be used for this scope. A finer grained representation of the problem consists in analyzing the capability to obtain ψ 1 and ψ 2 for each single strategy of the other agent a 2 : whenever a 1 is able to respond to a strategy of a 2 in order to achieve ψ 1 , then, against that strategy, it can also achieve ψ 2 . Formally, this can be obtained by the SL[DG] sentence
D. Strategy quantifications
In this section we formalize the behavioral semantics for the prenex fragment of SL, which plays a key role in maintaining the model-checking problem for SL[XG] as easy as ATL * . For this scope, we need first to define the concept of dependence map that is a Skolemization procedure for SL and, then, the related notion of elementariness, which represents a generic functional correspondent of what behavioral means for strategies. We start with some additional notion. Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables. For each y ∈ ℘ , we use Dep(℘, y) to denote the set of universally quantified variables x ∈ [[℘]] that precede y in ℘, that are the variable on which y depends. A valuation of variables over a set D is a partial function v : Var D. By Val D (V) V → D we denote the set of all valuation functions over D whose domain is V. y) is the restriction of v to Dep(℘, y). By DM D (℘) we denote the set of all dependence maps of ℘ over D. Intuitively, Item (i) says that θ takes the same values of its argument w.r.t. the universal variables in ℘ and Item (ii) ensures that the value of θ w.r.t. an existential variable y in ℘ only depends on variables in Dep(℘,y).
A fundamental theorem reported below states that if a formula is satisfiable then it is always possible to find a suitable dependence map returning the existential strategies in response to the universal ones. This procedure, easily proved to be correct by induction on the structure of the formula in [11] , can be seen as the equivalent of the Skolemization in first order logic. Here we give an intuition about it through an example. Consider the SL[XG] sentence ϕ = ℘ψ, where ℘ = [[x]] y and ψ = ((a 1 , x)(a 2 , y)G p) ((a 1 , y)(a 2 , x)F ¬p). In order to satisfy ϕ, we need to choose for every strategy associated with x a "right" strategy to associate with y such that ψ is true. A dependence map over strategies can be given to maintain the correlation between strategies for y chosen w.r.t. any possible one given for x.
Theorem II.2 (SL Strategy Quantification). Let G be a CGS and ϕ = ℘ψ be an SL sentence, where ψ is agent-closed and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)). Then, G |= ϕ iff there exists a dependence map θ ∈ DM Str(s0) (℘) such that G, θ(χ), s 0 |= ψ, for all χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s 0 ).
The above theorem substantially characterizes SL semantics by means of the concept of dependence map. Such a characterization enables the definition of alternative semantics, based on the choice of a subset of dependence maps that ensures better model properties and easier decision problems. Here, we consider the set of dependence maps that are elementary, which allows us to greatly simplify the reasoning about strategy quantifications by reducing them to a set of quantifications over actions, one for each track in their domains. Actually, this is a purely functional concept that allows to identify, from a computational point of view, a more tractable set of dependence maps over generic domain set.
We formally define elementariness, through the concept of adjoint function. To intuitively understand this concept, consider again the formula ϕ given above. As we have pointed out in Theorem II.2, a dependence map associates a strategy for y at every given strategy for x. By recalling that a strategy is a function from tracks to actions, this means that the behavior of the strategy for y on a certain track ρ, depends on the overall behavior of the strategy for x over all possible tracks. The adjoint function lets us to put all possible tracks as a common factor in the choice of strategies for y. Consequently, it will be enough for y to take into account how x behaves on ρ, that is the history of the current play. Let us now formalize the concept of adjoint function. From now on, we denote by g : Y → (X → Z) the operation of flipping of a generic function g : X → (Y → Z), i.e., the transformation of g by swapping the order of its arguments. Let D, T, U, and V be four sets, and m : At this point, as mentioned above, we introduce a notion of behavioral satisfiability, in symbols |= B , which requires the elementariness of dependence maps over strategies.
Definition II.6 (SL Behavioral Semantics). Let G be a CGS and ϕ = ℘ψ an SL sentence, where ψ is agentclosed and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)). Then, G |= B ϕ iff there exists a dependence map θ ∈ EDM Str(s0) (℘) such that G, θ(χ), s 0 |= ψ, for all χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s 0 ).
Observe that, differently from the classic semantics, the quantifications in a prefix are not treated individually but as an atomic block. This is due to the necessity of having a strict correlation between the point-wise structure of the quantified strategies.
III. BEHAVIORAL SEMANTICS
In this section, we show that in SL[XG] standard and behavioral semantics coincide. As seen in the previous section, the concept of elementariness is essentially a property of the dependence maps that allows to identify a way to satisfy a sentence in a behavioral manner. Looking at a prototypical SL[XG] sentence ℘( 1 ψ 1 · · · n ψ n ), with being either ∧ or ∨, a dependence map, once applied to the quantification prefix ℘, determines a set of strategies associated with the relative variables. Nevertheless, since each binding i possibly "distributes" those strategies to the agents in a different way, we may have n different complete assignments for ϕ and, hence, as many evolutions of the game. For instance, in the example of Figure 1 , if x, y 2 , and y 3 are interpreted as before (i.e., 1 ω , 1 ω , 0 ω , respectively) and z is set to the strategy that constantly executes the action 1, then 1 = (a 1 , x)(a 2 , y 2 )(a 3 , z) produces the path π 1 = s 1 s 2 s 3 s 3 · · · and 2 = (a 1 , x)(a 2 , z)(a 3 , y 3 ) the path π 2 = s 1 s 2 s 4 s 4 · · · . Thus, the main difficulty w.r.t. the proof of behavioral semantics for SL [XG] consists in dealing with all these different evolutions coherently. However, the fact that the goals can only be put either in conjunction or in disjunction ensures that these evolutions of the game "run in parallel" without interfering with each other. On the contrary, the same does not hold for SL [BG] . Consider, for example, the sentence ϕ = [[x]] y z (a, y) (b, x)X p ↔ (a, z)(b, x) F q and the CGS G of Figure 3 , where the agent a is the only one that controls the state s 0 , while the agent b controls the states s 1 and s 1 . It is not hard to see that G |= ϕ. However, we have that G |= B ϕ, since, to choose the value of the strategies to associate with the existential variables on s 0 , we necessarily need to know the entire strategy associated to x and not only its value on s 0 itself. In particular, agent a should foresight whether agent b intends to achieve, at some point in the future of the states s 1 and s 1 , the atomic proposition q or not. Therefore, agent a does not have any synthesizable action in the state s 0 .
As in [11] , to prove, instead, that SL[XG] admits behavioral strategies only, we reduce the check of G |= ϕ to a dependence-vs-valuation game, i.e., a turn-based two player game (TPG, for short), with the two players called Even and Odd, which is used to simulate the behavioral semantics. Intuitively, given a CGS G and an SL[XG] formula ϕ = ℘ψ, with ψ = ( 1 ψ 1 · · · n ψ n ), a strategy for the player Even corresponds to an elementary dependence map, while a strategy for the player Odd corresponds to a valuation of the universal variables. Thus, G |= B ϕ iff Even has a strategy that, no matter how the player Odd sets the universal variables, forces the play to satisfy ψ.
A. Dependence-vs-valuation game
Before introducing the formalization of the dependencevs-valuation game to which we reduce the verification of the SL[XG] modeling relation, we need the four auxiliary notions of walk, evolution, dependence cluster, and valuation cluster that constitute the building blocks of the game. In particular, evolutions are used as states of the game arena, while dependence and valuation clusters as possible moves of the two players. In addition, the walks allow to define the winning condition of the game. In the following, G denotes a CGS, s ∈ St a state, and ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) and B ⊆ Bnd(V), respectively, a quantification prefix and a set of binding prefixes for a given set of variables V ⊆ Var.
We have emphasized that, when the variables in V have been assigned with some strategies, different bindings produce in general different plays, so we introduce the notion of walk to formally deal with these multiple plays at the same time. Given a binding prefix ∈ B we denote by ζ : Ag → V the function associating with each agent the related variable in , i.e., for all a ∈ Ag, there is 0 ≤ i < | | such that ( ) i = (a, ζ (a) ). Then, a function wlk : B → Pth G is a walk if there exists an assignment χ ∈ Asg G (V, s) such that wlk( ) = play G (χ • ζ , s) , for all ∈ B. By Wlk G (B, s) we denote the set of all walks of G from s w.r.t. B. Moreover, by wlk G (χ, B, s) ∈ Wlk G (B, s) we indicate the unique walk derived from χ. An evolution takes a snapshot at a certain step i of all tracks that are evolving in a walk, representing in this way a possible position of the verification game behind the check of G |= ϕ. Formally, an evolution is a function evl : B → St for which there exist a walk wlk ∈ Wlk G (B, s) and an index i ∈ N such that evl( ) = (wlk( )) i , for all ∈ B. By Evl(B, s) we denote the set of all evolutions of G from s w.r.t. B.
From now on, let evl ∈ Evl(B, s) be an evolution. Then, a dependence cluster w.r.t. evl is a function dc : B → DM AcG (℘) such that, for all 1 , 2 ∈ B, if evl( 1 ) = evl( 2 ) then dc( 1 ) = dc( 2 ). By DC G (℘, B, evl, s) we denote the set of all dependence clusters for G in s w.r.t. ℘, B, and evl. Intuitively, a dependence cluster represents, at a certain step, how a dependence map behaves along the tracks produced by different bindings. Since a dependence map produces a unique assignment of variables, if two bindings are going along the same track (which is given by the condition evl( 1 ) = evl( 2 )), the dependence cluster has to return on them the same valuation of existential variables.
Finally, let V a subset of V. Then, a valuation cluster w.r.t. evl and V is a function vc : B → Val AcG (V ) such that, for all 1 , 2 ∈ B, if evl( 1 ) = evl( 2 ) then vc( 1 ) = vc( 2 ). By VC G (V , B, evl, s) we denote the set of all valuation clusters for G in s w.r.t. V , B, and evl. Intuitively, a valuation cluster represents different valuations of universal variables of the quantification prefix along the tracks produced by different bindings. Like dependence clusters, as far as two bindings are running along the same track, valuations of universal variables have to be the same.
At this point, we define the required dependence-vsvaluation game that mimics the game behind the behavioral semantics of SL[XG]. Informally, it consists of (i) two nonempty non-intersecting sets of states, N e and N o , for players Even and Odd, respectively, (ii) a designated initial state n 0 ∈ N e , and (iii) two binary relations E e ⊆ N e × N o and E o ⊆ N o × N e representing at each state the possible moves of Even and Odd, respectively. The notions of track, path, strategy, and play are analogous to those of a CGS and are not repeated here. However, to avoid confusion between concurrent game structures and the corresponding dependence-vs-valuation games, we denote with Mtc the set of all possible paths, namely matches, in a dependence-vs-valuation game. Finally, Win ⊆ Mtc is the winning set, i.e., the set of all paths that are winning for Even. H(G, s, W, ℘, B) N e , N o , E e , E o , n 0 , Win where: (℘, B, evl, s) 
Intuitively, the previous definition reformulates the verification process of a sentence ϕ as a zero-sum game where, step-by-step, the Even player attempts to satisfy ϕ by choosing "good" dependence clusters (Odd nodes) that, for each binding, interpret the existential variables and the Odd player replies with "bad" valuations of the universal variables (Even nodes) to try to make ϕ unsatisfied. In particular, the peculiarity of behavioral semantics is reformulated in this setting, through the concept of elementary dependence map, by means of the following notion of encasement. 
B. Proof of behavioral semantics
In this section, we describe the proof of the behavioral semantics for SL [XG] , which allows us to construct, in the next section, a suitable automata-theoretic procedure for its model-checking problem. Note that, due to the length and high-complex nature of the whole proof, we only sketch its main steps and refer to the extended version for full details.
From a very high-level point of view, the proof schema proceeds in a similar way to what was done in [11] for SL[1G]. Therefore, in order to simplify the presentation and better understand the new proof, we first recall the structure of the old one: (i) we start constructing a two player game H simulating SL[1G] behavioral semantics of a given sentence φ = ℘ ψ over an assigned CGS G; (ii) let P be the set of paths satisfying the LTL formula ψ, which is also the winning set of the game H, we prove that it is an encasement iff G |= B φ (see Definition 3.4 of [11] ); (iii) via the encasement property, we show that if player Even wins H then P is an encasement and, vice versa, if P is Borelian but not an encasement then player Odd wins H (encasement characterization lemma, see Lemma B.5 of [11] ); (iv) we prove that if player Odd wins the dual game H, obtained by the dual prefix ℘, then player Even wins the original game H (dependence-vs-valuation duality lemma, see Lemma B.4 of [11] ); (v) finally, we put all these facts together in the following way (see Theorem 4.24 of [11] ): (a) we suppose that G |= φ and assume P as the set of paths satisfying ¬ψ, which is also the Borelian winning set of the dual game H; (b) since G |= B ¬φ, by Item (ii), we get that P is not an encasement; (c) thus, by Item (iii), we derive that player Odd wins H; (d) so, by Item (iv), we have that player Even wins the game H; (e) now, again by Item (iii), we get that P is an encasement; (f) finally, by a last application of Item (ii), we conclude that G |= B φ. At the end, since the inverse direction,
Clearly, due to the fact that an SL[XG] sentence has to deal with more than one play at a time, in order to apply the same proof structure to this logic, we have to generalize the two player game described above. Then, walks and evolutions allow to coherently track the verification process of temporal operators on all plays derived by the bindings, in one shot.
However, it is important to observe that parameterizing all two-player game components w.r.t. bindings does not entail by itself that the proof for SL[1G] works directly for SL [XG] . Indeed, another fundamental aspects in our new approach is to show that when one of the two players has a winning strategy, he has a decoupled winning strategy, i.e., a way to chose his moves w.r.t. a given binding that does not depend on what the other player has done before on bindings that are not running on the same track. To formally prove this fact, we first introduce a topology of open and closed sets on walks and then prove the following two preliminary facts: ( Finally, note that the same two player game we have defined for SL[XG] could also be used to prove the behavioral semantics of the full SL[BG], as its structure does not change when we have generic Boolean combinations of goals. However, since we already know that SL[BG] admits non-behavioral strategies too, an immediate question that promptly arises is why the proof does not work for the latter logic. Essentially, the problem is that the winning set derived from a SL[BG] sentence does not satisfy the decoupled property we mentioned above. This is due to the fact that the induced sets of walks are neither open nor closed, but belong to higher levels of the related topological hierarchy. So, Lemmas III.1 and III.2 cannot hold for SL[BG].
IV. MODEL-CHECKING PROCEDURE
We finally solve the model-checking problem for SL [XG] and show that it is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, as it is for the less expressive ATL * and SL[1G] logics. The algorithmic procedure is based on an automata-theoretic approach, which reduces the decision problem for our logic to the emptiness problem of a suitable universal Co-Büchi tree automaton (UCT, for short) [23] . Our technique is innovative w.r.t. those proposed in literature for CTL * [24] and ATL * [3] , since it is based on the novel notion of elementary dependence map and behavioral semantics. In particular, we extend the procedure proposed in [11] for SL[1G], along with a machinery to handle the conjunction/disjunction of goals. The high-level idea behind this approach is to avoid the use of projections for the strategy quantifications (which is instead required for SL), by reducing them to action quantifications, which can be managed on each state of the model without a nonelementary blow-up. Naturally, this approach is correct, since SL[XG] has behavioral strategies only, as we proved before.
To proceed with the formal description of the modelchecking procedure, we first introduce the concept of encoding for the assignments over a CGS.
Intuitively, this is a tree T χ whose nodes correspond to all possible histories in the unraveling of the CGS G and whose labeling represents, for the given assignment χ, all actions that the strategies associated to the variables prescribe.
Definition IV.1 (Assignment-State Encoding). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St G one of its states, and χ ∈ Asg G (V, s) an assignment defined on the set V ⊆ Var ∪ Ag. Then, a lst(s · t) ), for all t ∈ T.
By a suitably embedding of the Vardi-Wolper construction [25] into a tree automaton, we build an UCT recognizing all assignment-state encodings derived by assignments satisfying a given goal.
Lemma IV.1 (Goal Automaton). Let G be a CGS and ψ a goal without principal subsentences. There is a UCT U G ψ with O(2 |ψ| ) states such that, for all states s ∈ St G and assignments
where T χ is the assignment-state encoding for χ and L(U G ψ ) is the set of trees U G ψ accepts. Now, we introduce an encoding for the information contained into the elementary dependence maps over strategies used to satisfy a given sentence. Intuitively, this is a tree similar to the assignment-state encoding, except that the labeling is used to represent the dependence maps over actions contained into the dependence map over strategies.
Definition IV.2 (Elementary Dependence-State Encoding).
Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St G one of its states, and θ ∈ EDM StrG (s) (℘) an elementary dependence map over strategies for a quantification prefix ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) over the set
is an elementary dependence-state encoding for θ if it holds that u(t) ( θ(s · t), lst(s · t)), for all t ∈ T.
In the next lemma, we show the existence of an UCT that accepts a given elementary dependence-state encoding T iff an input UCT accepts all assignment-state encodings T derived from T . This automaton is used to handle the strategy quantifications on each state of the model, by means of quantification over actions modeled by the choice of an action dependence map. We can now state the next theorem that is at the base of the model-checking procedure for SL [XG] . Actually, we build an automaton for an SL[CG] sentence and translate the modelchecking question to its non-emptiness problem. In the case we start with an SL[DG] sentence, first we dualize it in an SL[CG] one, apply the previous construction, and check for the emptiness of the obtained automaton. Thus, the result for SL[DG] follows merely as a corollary.
Theorem IV.1 (SL[XG] Sentence Automaton). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St G one of its states, and φ = ℘ ∈B ψ (resp., φ = ℘ ∈B ψ ) an SL[CG] (resp., SL[DG]) sentence. Then, there exists an UCT U G,s φ with O(2 |φ| ) states such that G, ∅, s |= φ iff L(U G,s φ ) = ∅ (resp., L(U G,s φ ) = ∅). Finally, by a simple calculation of the size of U φ and the complexity of the related (non) emptiness problem, we state in the next theorem the exact complexity of the modelchecking problem for SL [XG] . Note that, in order to maintain a low data complexity, we first translate the UCT into an NPT and then make the product with the CGS under analysis.
Theorem IV.2 (SL[XG] Model-Checking). The modelchecking problem for SL[XG] is PTIME-COMPLETE w.r.t. the size of the model and 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE w.r.t. the size of the specification.
V. DISCUSSION
Reasoning implicitly about strategies, as done in ATL * and its several variants, works well for two persons/teams zero-sum games, where at the abstract level what matters are simply the outcomes that players can ensure. However, for multi-player games with non-zero-sum objectives, it has been observed that an explicit representation of strategies can be useful in several cases to better capture the involved reasoning and in expressing various solution concepts, such as Nash, resilient, and secure equilibria. It is for this reason that a first-order framework such as SL, which allows quantification over strategy terms, is a natural setting to explore. Given this context, SL seems somehow even too expressive in the sense that it is possible to formulate sentences that can be satisfied only if we accept non-behavioral existentially quantified strategies. Such sentences can be considered as the undesirable part of SL for several reasons. First, their satisfaction joins together different possible plays of a game, whereas in standard game theory each single play ends up with an utility profile or a winning agent, so they do not have a clear game-theoretical counterpart. Second, their meaning is somewhat deceptive: even when they say that an agent can in principle respond to another agent, actually the relative strategy is not synthesizable, since it requires information that is inherently not at the disposal of that agent. Finally, also from a computational point of view, all relative reasoning tasks are severely affected. In particular, model checking is non-elementary in the size of the specification.
Clearly, all these considerations arise the problem to isolate the desirable part of SL that requires behavioral strategies only. This property essentially says that in order to reason about strategies it suffices to reason about individual actions, for each history of the game. Thanks to this, we are able to employ an automata-theoretic approach through which the strategy quantifications can be handled without the need to perform the projection operations, which usually implies a non-elementary blow up of the resulting automaton. In this paper, we have addressed the question of which are the SL syntactic fragments of this sort. Specifically, we have introduced and investigated the conjunctive-goal and disjunctive-goal SL, respectively called SL[CG] and SL[DG], and shown that they admit a behavioral semantics. Since by allowing any Boolean combination of goals, the resulting logic, named SL[BG], does not retain this property [11] , we have that SL[CG] and SL[DG] are the maximal syntactic fragments of SL that are behavioral. Moreover, we proved that their model-checking problem is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, i.e., asymptotically not more expensive than the one for SL[1G], which strictly subsumes ATL * . This strengthens the hypothesis that being behavioral is a sufficient condition to maintain the same complexity of ATL * .
Finally, it is important to stress that the fragments we have introduced in this work can be considered as the first relevant attempt to define a logic formalism able to describe synthesizable properties of non-zero-sum games, such as coalition decomposability, arbitrage and implication of winning conditions, etc., still maintaining a 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE model-checking problem.
